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COMMENTS
Looking for a Prince Among the Frogs:
Solutions to ERISA's Preemptive Effect on
Improving Health Care
MK GAEDEKE ROLANDt
"We've got an emergency.... Charlie's about to kiss the
pig."1 These words were spoken by political lobbyist Connie
Barron, a former nurse working to promote the cause of the
Texas Medical Association (TMA).' A "pig," Ms. Barron
explained, is a derogatory term for undesirable legislation.3
She was referring to Representative Charlie Norwood's
defection to a Republican-sponsored health-care reform bill
that conspicuously omitted a provision grantin4g patients
the right to sue a managed care organization (MCO)-a
tJ.D. Candidate, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law, 2000. I
gratefully acknowledge the generous assistance and guidance of Professor
James Wooten who invested many hours in this Comment. I also gratefully
acknowledge the support and guidance of Professor Martha McCluskey who
believed in the merits of this project, and Professor Sheila Shulman who helped
me begin this manuscript. Pour mes fits, je ne pourrais pas souvenir ma vie
avant vous, et 6 mon mari, Jean-Michel, vraiment mon prince parmis les
grenouilles. Je t'aime toujours.
1. Laurie McGinley, Charm and Grit: HMO-Liability Battles Plunge a
Former Nurse Into High-Profile, WALL ST. J., July 15, 1998, at 1.
2. See id.
3. See id. Ms. Barron credits the term to John Nance Garner, Franklin
Roosevelt's first vice-president and a Texan. Id.
4. The term health maintenance organization (HMO) became popular in the
mid-1970s to describe a prepaid health delivery model which focused on illness
prevention in addition to treatment. The term managed care organization
(MCO) is more recently developed terminology that describes a variety of
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right he had staunchly promoted in his own bill.' Health-
care consumer rights advocates compare leaving out the
right to sue over allegedly harmful benefit determinations
to leaving the First Amendment out of the Bill of Rights.'
Almost a quarter of a century ago, Congress passed two
significant pieces of consumer-oriented legislation, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISAY
and the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973(HMOA).8 Because these two acts were passed within mere
months of each other9 and at a time when HMOs were
largely unheard of in employee benefit packages, no one
could have foreseen the long-term implications of their
inevitable entanglement.
Health maintenance organizations are consumer-
oriented because they aim to promote health rather than
merely treat illness. At their inception, HMOs were
envisioned as a prelude to national health insurance,0
though this never transpired. In stark contrast to national
health insurance withering, HMOs and managed care
organizations have flourished. Managed care took over
much of the American health-care system by becoming the
predominant," and in some instances the only, insurance
offered by employers."
health-care delivery models which incorporate cost management. Although not
necessarily synonymous, the terms are often used interchangeably.
5. See McGinley, supra note 1, at 1; H.R. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997).
6. See Rod Watson, Maybe We Should Formulate Public Policy in Hollywood
Instead of in Washington, BUFF. NEWS, July 30, 1998, at B2.
7. ERISA § 514.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-17 (1973).
9. See Michael S. Gordon, ERISA, ESOPs and Senator Javits: The Mind of a
Reformer, 7 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 3, 4 (1988) (stating ERISA was signed into law on
Sept. 2, 1974).
10. See Kathleen S. Andersen, Conference Summary, 7 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 71,
75 (1988).
11. See Paul Fronstin, Employment-Based Health Insurance: A Look at Tax
Issues and Public Opinion, 211 EBRI: ISSUE BRIEF 3 (1999) (stating 64.2% of
non-elderly Americans receive their health insurance through an employer);
Robert A. Clifford, Physicians' Liability in a Managed Care Environment, 10
HEALTH LAWYER 5, 8 (1997) (relating that nearly 75% of employees that receive
employer-sponsored health benefits obtain them through MCOs, up from only
5% in 1980); Ryan Steven Johnson, ERISA Doctor in the House? The Duty to
Disclose Physician Incentives to Limit Health Care, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1631, 1638
(1998) (stating 73% of American workers obtain health care coverage through
their employer).
12. See Karen Davis and Cathy Schoen, Managed Care, Choice, and Patient
Satisfaction, http'//www.cmwf.org/healthcare/satis.html (collected Oct. 19,
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ERISA also began as consumer-oriented legislation
because it was enacted primarily to protect employees'
retirement expectations. In enacting ERISA, Congress
intended to create a single national standard to regulate
pension funds by precluding states 3 from regulating
employee benefit plans. However, Congress's intention that
ERISA should prevent states from regulating health
insurance is ambiguous. 4 Nevertheless, ERISA is so broad 5
that it reaches all private employer-sponsored benefit
programs, including employee health plans, 6 through a
clause that preempts any state law7 relating to 8 employee
1998, 16:02:00 EST) (on file with the author and with BUFF. L. REV.).
13. "State" under ERISA is defined as "any political subdivisions thereof, or
any agency or instrumentality of either which purports to regulate, directly or
indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans covered by this
subchapter." ERISA § 514(c)(2).
14. See Andersen, supra note 10, at 74. Compare Washington Physicians
Serv. Ass'n v. Gregoire, 147 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that because an
ERISA "plan" is not the insurance policy but the employer's decision or promise
to purchase insurance, a Washington state law which mandates coverage of
alternative or unorthodox medical services is not preempted by ERISA, does fall
under the insurance savings clause, and is not affected by the deemer clause),
and Phillip H. Corboy, Holding Managed Care Accountable, Cinc. TRIB., July
22, 1999, at 22 (stating HMOs' immunity due to ERISA was not something
Congress intended or considered), with Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985) (holding that a Massachusetts statute
mandating health-care plans include specified minimum health-care benefits
was not preempted as it applied to insured plans, but recognized the anomaly
that it did apply to self-funded plans because of the inherent structure of
ERISA).
15. ERISA has been characterized as one of the most "far-reaching pieces of
domestic legislation passed by Congress in the past 25 -years." William T.
Payne, ERISA: Its More Places Than You Thought It Could Be, 83 A.B.A.J. 62,
63 (1997).
16. Regulation of both health matters and insurance have traditionally been
left to the states. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 647 (1995) (holding that any
conclusion other than failing to preempt a state law on hospital surcharges
would "have the unsettling result of barring any state regulation of hospital
costs on the theory that all laws with indirect economic effects on ERISA plans
are pre-empted"); Hillsborough County. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S.
707, 719 (1985) (stating a subject of national concern such as ERISA
preemption and pension funds does not mean "every federal statute ousts all
related state law").
17. See ERISA § 514(c)(1) (defining state laws as "all laws, decisions, rules,
regulations, or other State actions having the effect of law, of any State").
18. See ERISA § 514(a) (stating "[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b) of
this section, the provisions of this subchapter shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan
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benefit plans.
Arguably, twenty-five years later, neither ERISA nor
HMOA is serving their consumer-oriented goals. HMOs
have evolved into managed care organizations whose
purpose shifted from access to care to containing the cost of
care. ERISA, in turn, has enabled MCOs to escape liability
and accountability by not regulating their activities and not
allowing states to, either.
Part I of this comment describes the historical
influences behind the enactment of ERISA and the
development of managed-care organizations. This historical
perspective is important to (1) better appreciate the
evolutionary process that led to the current barriers to
improving health-care delivery and (2) to formulate
effective strategies to close the regulatory void and remedy
gap that ERISA created. Part II reviews the current status
of attempts to address the needs of subscribers within
ERISA's regulatory framework. Part III outlines the
challenges now facing health-care consumers covered by
employer-sponsored managed care programs. Finally, Part
IV proposes incentive-compatible solutions to promote
quality, cost-effective care with minimal regulation. No
single solution is likely to solve ERISA's harmful
preemptive effect on improving health care. The
complexities of multiple interest groups entangled with
unsatisfactory legislative and regulatory efforts mean
multiple strategies are needed to successfully improve
health care in both the short and the long term.
described in section 4(a) and not exempt under section 4(b)"). A key to
understanding this passage lies in the distinction between relating to the plan
and relating to the benefit. Preemption is more likely to occur when the action
relates to an ERISA plan than when the action relates to benefits themselves.
See Travelers, 514 U.S. 645 (holding that a statute providing for surcharges did
not relate to employee benefit plans under ERISA and was therefore not
preempted); General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Castonguay, 984 F.2d 1518 (9th Cir.
1993) (stating ERISA preempts claims of relationships it regulates
comprehensively such as between plan and plan participant, and plan and
employer, but does not preempt that which ERISA does not regulate).
1490 [Vol. 47
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PART I: HISTORICAL INFLUENCES ON ERISA AND MANAGED
CARE ORGANIZATIONS
A. Origins of Managed Care Organizations
Today's managed care organizations trace their roots to
models of health-care delivery developed in the early 1900s
known as prepaid group practice (PGP).9 PGPs contrasted
sharply with the dominant fee-for-service model. Fee-for-
service provided incentives to health-care professionals to
provide the maximum amount of services in an illness-
oriented delivery system." A radical concept in their time,
PGP plans employed salaried physicians to provide care to
enrollees who prepaid a set fee. This payment arrangement
created incentives to both prevent and treat disease with
cost management a desirable, but at that time, secondary
goal.2 ' Despite widespread opposition from organized
medicine, the Nixon administration repackaged PGPs in
the 1970s as health-maintenance organizations to address
accelerating health-care costs that resulted largely from
Medicare and Medicaid.22 President Nixon supported HMOs
refashioned as a new health-care delivery system that
would emphasize and provide financial incentives for health
promotion while controlling costs." Nevertheless, during
the 1970s and 1980s, health-care costs continued to
skyrocket.' In fact, it was not until the 1990s that health-
19. See Lawrence Brown, The Evolution of Managed Care in the US, 14
PHARMACOECONOmICS 37, 37-39 (1998).
20. See id. at 37-38.
21. See id. at 37-39.
22. See id. at 38; see generally Deven C. McGraw, Financial Incentives to
Limit Services: Should Physicians be Required to Disclose These to Patients?, 83
Geo. L.J. 1821 (1995); Randolph E. Sarnacki, Contractual Theories of Recovery
in the HMO Provider-Subscriber Relationship: Prospective Litigation for Breach
of Contract, 36 BUFF. L. REv. 119 (1987).
23. Compare Helen Halpin Sheauffier & Susan A. Chapman, Health
Promotion and Managed Care: Surveys of California's Health Plans and
Population, 279 JAMA 161, 161 (1998) (finding in a recent study that even in
the 1990s, many managed care organizations do not have health promotion as
an integral part of their business, and that HMOs offer such programs only as a
marketing vehicle), with Thomas M. Burton, HMO, Using Billing Data, Alerts
Doctors on Which Services Are Being Neglected, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 1999, at
B4 (revealing a study where 42,000 doctors in 17 states are improving
preventive care as a result of HlIO monitoring and reporting).
24. See generally, e.g., Brown, supra note 19, at 37-40.
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care costs first became controlled under our present form of
MCOs."5 But with controlled costs came controlled care
until, under managed care organizations, coverage, and
care finally clashed.6
In order to improve health-care delivery, reforms must
address the potentially problematic connection between
denial of coverage by an insurer and the inability of the
subscriber to receive care. Under traditional fee-for-service
systems, patients received health care before disputes arose
about coverage. While in the past insurers might have
denied subscribers payment or coverage for care,
subscribers seldom failed to actually obtain the health
services because patients received care before health
insurers paid the providers. In contrast, MCOs' prospective
and capitated payments prevent an individual from
receiving health-care services because denial of payment
prevents providers from ever delivering health services.27
ERISA hampers states' efforts to address these issues and
improve health care' by prohibiting states from effectively
regulating employer-sponsored health benefits to assure
participants are receiving promised health care.
B. Employer-Sponsored Health Benefits and ERISA
During World War II, businesses were unable to raise
wages in a job market characterized by worker shortages.29
To compete for potential employees, employers offered
health insurance as a benefit.' ° Because employers
sponsored and often paid most of the cost of health
insurance, they, not employee-subscribers, determined
what policies were available.' Since health insurance is
offered as an employee benefit, employer-sponsored health
25. See id.
26. See William M. Sage, Judicial Opinions Involving Health Insurance
Coverage: Trompe L'Oeil or Window on the World? 31 IND. L. REV. 49, 52 (1998).
27. See Consumer Complaints Against HMOs Rise: Regulators Are Troubled
that Disputes Focus on Refusals to Provide Care, THE SUN (Baltimore), Nov. 1,
1998, at 19A (reporting state insurance regulators relate "surging numbers" of
complaints primarily against HMOs and a shift in complaints from payment
disputes to denials and delays regarding treatment and medications).
28. See Sage, supra note 26, at 52.
29. See Fronstin, supra note 11, at 3; James I. Glassman, Fix That Health-
Insurance Tax Quirk, BUFF. NEWS, July 25, 1998, at C3.
30. See Fronstin, supra note 11, at 3; Glassman, supra note 29, at C3.
31. See Glassman, supra note 29, at C3.
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benefits have come under the regulatory domain of ERISA
since its inception."
Congress enacted ERISA to protect participants'
employee benefits, specifically pension funds. No express
Congressional intent to affect, or especially to protect,
3 4
health insurers is evident. 5 Rather, Congress enacted
ERISA in large part due to the injustices many Americans
suffered when they spent their lives working and saving
only to find at retirement their pension funds were
insolvent. Ironically, injustices to working Americans have
again led to calls for reform of employee benefit plans, but
this time the focus is health care, not pension funds. And
this time ERISA is not the solution, but the problem.
ERISA failed to create meaningful regulations or
appropriate financial incentives to induce MCOs to achieve
quality outcomes. ERISA compounded the problem by also
creating a "remedy gap" when it preempted traditional
state court remedies.
Congress intended ERISA to preempt state laws
regulating pensions.37 However, in enacting the sweeping
32. See ERISA § 1, et. seq.
33. See Corey J. Ayling, New Developments in ERISA Preemption and
Judicial Oversight of Managed Care, 31 CREIGHTON L. REv. 403, 406 (1998).
34. See Wendy I. Mariner, Liability for Managed Care Decisions: The
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and the Uneven Playing
Field, 86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 863, 868 (1996) (stating ERISA has accidentally
become the protector of employer sponsored health plans rather than
employees).
35. See Ayling, supra note 33, at 407; Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Schaffer,
Semi-Preemption in ERISA" Legislative Process and Health Policy, 7 AM. J. TAX
POVY 47, 47 (1988); see generally Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA Preemption and
Regulation of Managed Health Care: The Case for Managed Federalism, 23 AM.
J. L. & MED. 251 (1997); Gordon, supra note 9, at 4 (describing Senator Jacob
Javits' intent as sponsor of the ERISA bill to protect workers' pensions and
increase their morale).
36. See Gordon, supra note 9, at 5-6, 9.
37. See ERISA § 502(e) which covers claims brought under the terms of the
plan stating that both state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction.
Section 502(a)(1)(B) covers claims made to enforce or clarify rights under an
employee plan and also states both state and federal courts have concurrent
jurisdiction. An employee can also file an action under § 502(c) in state court.
However, an MCO has a right to remove any benefit claim or state court claim
to federal court when the claim is preempted by ERISA. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987). A state law claim is most often preempted by
ERISA if it "relates to an employee benefit plan," even though only state law
claims have been alleged. See, e.g., Howard Shapiro, Preemeption of State Law,
83 A.B.A. J. 67 (1997); Smith v. Dunham-Bush, Inc., 959 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir.
1992); Tingey v. Pixley-Richards W., Inc., 953 F.2d 1124, (9th Cir. 1992);
1493
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legislation, Congress preempted state regulation of health
benefits even though regulating insurance is an area
traditionally left to the states.8 Underscoring this lack of
Congressional intent are two important factors: (1) the
Supreme Court has long stated a strong presumption
against preemption of traditional state areas of regulation"9
like insurance and health, and (2) the text added to ERISA
in 1974 barring policyholders from bringing legal action in
state courts for allegedly harmful health benefit
determinations was a last minute addition.4"
Because Congress very much intended to preempt state
pension plan regulation, ERISA's preemptive statutory
language is strong. Therefore, preemption of the states'
ability to regulate employee health benefits may have been
an unintended consequence of the strong intent to preemept
pension plans. The preemption clause that now prompts
convincing criticism from some of our highest courts4' was
Fitzgerald v. Codex Corp., 882 F.2d 586, 588 (1st Cir. 1989); Shiffler v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 838 F.2d 78, 81 (3d Cir. 1988).
38. See Fox & Schaffer, supra note 35, at 48, 58. A discussion of the
historical role of the states in regulating areas of both health and insurance is
beyond the scope of this paper. The reader is referred to other sources such as
Kevin T. Salter, Insurance Law: What Every Lawyer and Businessperson Needs
to Know, 584 PRAC. L. INST. / Lit. 171 (1998) and the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1011, et. seq., (1945).
39. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1998) (stating
that the Supreme Court has "addressed claims of pre-emption with the starting
presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law");
Hillsborough County. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 702 (1985); City
of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 643 (1977).
40. See David Hess, How Far Will Congress Go in Reforming Managed
Care?, BUFF. NEWS, Mar. 29, 1998, at H5; Fox & Schaffer, supra note 35, at 48.
41. See Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1505 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that
while ERISA was "designed to protect employees' pension rights," it had turned
"into a law that strips them of most of the protection they previously enjoyed
under state law .... "); Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th
Cir. 1992) (holding that ERISA compelled the court to reach a result that there
was no remedy, state or federal, for what may have been a serious mistake in
the death of their unborn child and that this holding was troubling because it
eliminated an important check on medical decisions made in utilization review
systems, created less deterrence against substandard medical decision making,
and provided cost incentives against compliance with standards of care); Ricci v.
Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316, 318 (D.N.J. 1993) (commenting that Congress
needs to clarify the scope of ERISA preemption); Robert Pear, Hands Tied,
Judges Rue Law That Limits H.M.O. Liability, N.Y. TnMEs Abstracts, July 11,
1998, at 1 (stating federal judges around the country are urging Congress to
make changes to ERISA that would cease to protect health insurance
companies against tort liability).
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initially backed by a diverse array of supporters-including
organized labor and corporations-that did not want to be
subjected to the potentially differing regulations and
taxation of many states.42 None of these groups wanted
states to be able to tax or regulate the employee benefit
plans they had negotiated under the Taft-Hartley Act.'
Large labor unions in particular believed preemption was to
their advantage because they feared non-uniform
regulation among the states that could interfere with
collective bargaining." Large businesses that operated in
many states similarly feared the burden of differing state
regulations.45 The insurance industry may also have joined
the business leaders in their opposition to the states'
mandates because they feared mandates would drive some
businesses to drop health insurance altogether.46
Ultimately, however, health insurers may not have
understood, recognized, or foreseen the true impact and
significance of the preemption clause47 on a future that
included managed care organizations. Health insurers and
the Department of Labor, which administers ERISA, were
largely on the sidelines and uninvolved in the final changes
in the preemption clause."
Soon after ERISA passed, its preemption clause became
a significant obstacle to formulating effective health-care
policies. Throughout the 1980s, states passed increasing
numbers of mandates to respond to the need for health
policies at the state level since the federal government
abdicated its leadership on health issues during the Reagan
era.49 But the states' inability to reach self-insured plans
42. See Fox & Schaffer, supra note 35, at 49; Farrell, supra note 35, at 257;
see generally Howard Shapiro, ERISA Preemption: Rights Defense Attorneys
Should Exercise, FOR THE DEFENSE 28 (1998).
43. See Farrell, supra note 34, at 257; Fox & Schaffer, supra note 35, at 50.
44. See Fox & Schaffer, supra note 35, at 51.
45. See id. at 50.
46. See id. at 60. Fear that employers will drop health insurance benefits if
mandates increase costs remains a common argument today; see also, e.g.,
Wendy K. Mariner, State Regulation of Managed Care and the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1986, 1989 (1996).
47. See Fox & Schaffer, supra note 35, at 51. The chief lobbyist for the
Health Insurance Association of America was recuperating from open-heart
surgery during the final ERISA negotiations and frankly stated that he did not
think anyone was thinking of the health implications of ERISA. See id. at 51-52.




hampered attempts to improve health care. 0 ERISA
preempted the states' ability to regulate the content of
employer-sponsored health benefits, and even preempted
the ability of states to require employers to offer health
coverage at all.5' Yet states could, through ERISA's "savings
clause,"" directly regulate commercial insurers that
underwrote employee benefits provided by ERISA health
plans, even if this was "indirect regulation" of employee
benefit plans."3 This was only a partial achievement,
however, because any self-funded plan remained
unreachable. Beginning in 1977, courts consistently held
that while states could regulate health insurance written by
insurance companies, and thereby indirectly regulate
employee health plans, they could not circumvent ERISA to
regulate employers' self-funded health plans 4  by
"deeming"55 them insurance companies.5
C. On the Heels of ERISA, Conflict of Cost and Care
Shortly following the enactments of ERISA and HMOA,
cost containment became the major goal of the nation's
health policy, thus displacing expanded access to care as a
50. See id.
51. See id. at 53. Some sources have suggested that because employers are
not obligated to offer employee benefits, Congress has given employers, benefits
plans, and therefore HMO insurers immunities from liability to encourage
employers to offer benefits. See Health Administration Responsibility Project:
ERISA Outline, http'//www.harp.org/erisa.htm (collected Nov. 11, 1998,
11:25:00 EST) (on file with the author and with BUFF. L. REV.).
52. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A). The "savings clause" states that preemption does
not apply to "any law of any state which regulates insurance, banking or
securities." Id. See also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (where
the court used the criteria of the McCarran-Ferguson Act to determine if a
disputed state law fell under the business of insurance. If three criteria are not
met, the action is not insurance for purposes of the savings clause and thus
saved from preemption. The three criteria are the following: the practice has
the effect of spreading risk among all the insured, the practice is an integral
part of the policy relationship between the insured and insurer, and the practice
is limited to entities within the insurance industry).
53. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747
(1985); Farrell, supra note 35, at 263.
54. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co, 471 U.S. at 724-25; Wadsworth v.
Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 75 (1st Cir. 1977); Fox & Schaffer, supra note 35, at 53.
55. See ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1994) (the "deemer
clause").
56. Despite the savings clause, the "deemer clause" does not allow a state to
deem any employee benefit plan an insurance plan solely to regulate it. See id.
1496 [Vol. 47
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priority. 7  Indeed, the rising number of uninsured
Americans is testimony to the impact of this shift in goals.58
Nonetheless, the new commitment to cost containment
never completely replaced the goal of increased access to
care. 9 Consequently, the goals of coverage, care, and cost
containment clashed in the 1990s. Skyrocketing costs for
health-care coverage drove employers to managed-care
organizations." However, managed care has turned out to
be no one's prince.
Arguably health-care costs have not decreased under
managed care.6' What has decreased is the amount of care
provided and the resources utilized.62 Managed care
organizations have contained costs by restricting access to
care, particularly medical specialists; limiting utilization of
resources; and shifting costs and risks to institutions,
providers, and subscribers. MCOs may have lowered
57. See Fox & Schaffer, supra note 35, at 52; Mariner, supra note 46, at
1989.
58. See Paul Fronstin, Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of
the Uninsured, 192 EBRI ISSUE BRIEF 1 (1999) (stating "[t]he percentage of
uninsured Americans has been increasing since at least 1987" with 17.7% of
nonelderly Americans without health insurance); Jane Bryant Quinn, Federal
Bill on Patient's Rights Is Needed So That People Get Treatment They Require,
BUFF. NEws, Apr. 11, 1998, at A6; see also Brown, supra note 19, at 39 (stating
the number of uninsured Americans now exceeds 40 million).
59. See Mariner, supra note 46, at 1989.
60. See Clifford, supra note 11, at 8 (relating that the number of employees
covered by MCOs has nearly quadrupled since 1980).
61. See Employers Expect Health Rate Hikes, BUS. INS., Jan. 11, 1999, at 35
(finding increase in premiums for traditional indemnity plans actually rose less
than premiums for managed care organizations in 1999); Tristan Mabry,
Corporate Performance 1998 Review: 4th Quarter, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 1999, at
013 (stating premiums are rising in 1999); Michael Prince & Amanda Milligan,
Health Care Pricing is Top Concern of Benefit Managers, BUS. INS., Dec. 21,
1998, at 3 (revealing managed care organizations increased health plan rates to
most employers for 1999); What's News, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 1998, at Al
(stating investors expect managed care companies to have sharply higher rate
increases in 1999).
62. Despite some early decreases, premiums have continued to rise. See
Farrell, supra note 35, at 252 (stating to date, managed care has provided
essentially a one-time lowering of health costs with an unclear future on their
endurance); see also WILLIAM J. CURRAN, ET. AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHIcs
1341 (1998) (stating cost savings may really only have occurred in high-priced
markets and by attracting younger, healthier subscribers); Mitchel Benson,
Calpers Takes New Tack with HMOs, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1999 at CA2 (stating
Kaiser Permanente's rates will rise 11.7% this year); Rhonda L. Rundle, Can
Managed Care Manage Costs?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1999, at Al (quoting a study
calling for health-care costs to rise 9% in 1999 after rising 6.1% in 1998).
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premiums for employers by transferring costs and limiting
services, but cost shifting should not be confused with cost
savings.' When MCOs create incentives not to provide
care, remain unregulated by the federal government, and
are shielded from effective state regulation, the clash
between cost containment and quality care should be no
surprise. ERISA preemption has effectively reduced
liability and fostered a system where incentive structures
favor denials of care, not treatment. Indirectly, ERISA has
lowered costs for MCOs in three principal ways: (1) by
permitting employer-sponsored health plans to exclude or
limit coverage for select illnesses or conditions;65 (2) by
barring state law claims that would provide real remedies
to subscribers for resulting injuries; and (3) by providing
only meaningless remedies in federal court.66
PART II: CURRENT EFFORTS TO REGULATE HEALTH BENEFITS
AND PROVIDE REMEDIES DESPITE ERISA PREEMPTION
Not all insured patients are treated and protected
equally in a court of law. In effect, ERISA provisions
63. See, e.g., Mariner, supra note 46, at 1986 (giving an example of managed
care organizations externalizing costs as states prohibiting hospitals from
discharging new mothers before 48 hours without their consent, yet MCOs
refuse to pay for more than 24 hours of care. MCOs have reduced costs by
shifting or externalizing those costs they deny); see also Ronald Bronow,
E.R.I.S.A.-Employees Receive Insurance Shaft Again,
http'J/www.hmopage.orglerisa.html, (collected Mar. 1, 1999, 17:53:00 EST) (on
file with the author and with BUFF. L. REV.).
64. This is in contrast to the traditional fee-for-service plan which provided
incentives only for providing care.
65. See McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding
that an employer could place $5,000 lifetime cap on health benefits paid for HIV
treatment).
66. See Barry B. Cepelewicz et. al., Recent Developments in Medicine and
Law, 33 ToRT & INS. L.J. 583 (1998).
67. See Sage, supra note 26, at 52; Angela M. Easley, A Call to Congress to
Amend ERISA Preemption of HMO Medical Malpractice Claims: The
Dissatisfactory Distinction Between Quality and Quantity of Care, 20 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 293, 294-97 (1998) (comparing Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan
of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc. 958 F. Supp. 1137, 1139 (E.D. Va. 1997) (where
direct liability claim for malpractice against employee sponsored-HMO was
dismissed) with Fox v. Healthnet, No. 219692 (Cal. Super. Ct., Riverside City
1993) (where claim against government-sponsored HMO resulted in $89 million
award which included $77 million in punitive damages that would be
unavailable under ERISA)); see also Dukes v. U.S. HealthCare, Inc. 57 F.3d
350, 358 (1995) (stating in dicta, "But patients enjoy the right to be free from
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overruling state laws stripped most Americans of their
historical legal protections against health insurance
companies' negligence.68  Approximately 150 million
Americans participate in employer-sponsored health
insurance plans regulated by ERISA, leaving these
subscribers without the ability to bring legal challenges
with meaningful remedies when health care is denied,
improper, or inadequate. 9 Of this number, 48 million are in
self-insured plans that are completely exempt from any
state-enforced consumer protections. ' In essence, state
insurance regulations protect only those who have
individual policies or are employees of state or local
governments, both of which provide them with an array of
legal rights and remedies.7 '
Rights accorded to Medicare recipients offer another
example of Americans having different health-care rights
and remedies solely dependent upon who pays for their
health insurance. In August 1998, Medicare patients
became entitled to immediate hearings and other
protections for adverse benefit determinations by MCOs.72
These individuals possess rights solely because the
government, not a private employer, purchases their
insurance."3 Other non-Medicare subscribers in the very
medical malpractice regardless of whether or not their medical care is provided
through an ERISA plan."); Goodrich v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 26 Pens. & Ben.
Rep. (BNA) 247 (Jan. 25, 1999) (where because plaintiff was a government
employee, a $120.5 million dollar verdict was awarded for denying coverage of
cancer treatment at an out-of-plan facility that would have been preempted
under an ERISA plan); Mariner, supra note 45, at 1989 (stating that as more
employers drop health plans or change to self-funded plans, states' protective
legislations benefit fewer Americans).
68. See Stephanie Overman, Legislation Seeking to Close Loophole
Protecting HMOs from Liability Suits, PHYS. FIN. NEWS, May 15, 1997, at 34
(quoting Representative Charlie Norwood).
69. See Fronstin, supra note 11, at 3; Hess, supra note 40, at H5.
70. See Hess, supra note 40, at H5.
71. See Weaver v. Employers Underwriters, Inc., 13 F.3d 172 (5th Cir. 1994)
(holding that ERISA preemption was improper because plaintiff was an
independent contractor and therefore lacked ERISA standing); Sage, supra note
26, at 52.
72. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Consumer Grievance and Appeal Procedures in
Managed Care Plans, 10 HEALTH LAW. 17, 18 (1998); Ruling Favors Medicare
Patients. Court Establishes Their Rights When Care Denied by HMO, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 14, 1998, at 3A.
73. If the sponsor of the plan is the government rather than a private
employer, procedural due process guarantees of the Constitution apply. Plan
subscribers of MCO-Medicare and Medicaid programs are entitled to
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same MCO are denied these same protections because their
insurance is purchased through an employer-sponsored
plan. 4
A. ERISA and Causes of Action in the MCO-
Employee/Subscriber Relationship
ERISA preempts state law claims against MCOs
whenever a claim "relates to" an employee benefit plan."
Until 1994, the Supreme Court had held that ERISA's
preemption should be defined broadly. 6 Thus, the federal
courts had generally held that any state laws that
regulated or state actions that pertained to employee
welfare plans "related to" employee benefits." The result
was that health benefit claims otherwise heard in state
administrative hearings. See Kinney, supra note 72, at 18.
74. See id.
75. See ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994); see also, Tolton v.
American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 942-43 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding ERISA
preempts claim that benefits were improperly denied); Madonia v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 11 F.3d 444, 445 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding preemption of health
insurance claim appropriate because ERISA plan is not just purchasing
insurance, but is an employee welfare plan); Hansen v. Continental Ins. Co.,
940 F.2d 971, 979 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding preemption appropriate because
claim was related to employee benefit); Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable HCA
Corp., 944 F.2d 1272, 1279 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding claim of negligent
misrepresentation concerning employee benefit plan coverage was properly
preempted to federal court).
76. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983) (stating a law relates
to a plan it if has "a connection with or reference to a plan" and is preempted
even if it is consistent with ERISA and only indirectly affects employee benefit
plans, but recognizing some actions may have an effect on employee benefit
plans that is too remote, tenuous, or peripheral to be found to relate to the
plan); see also FMC v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 52 (1990) (holding ERISA's
preemption clause "broadly" establishes exclusive federal concern); Pilot Life
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987) (holding that state common-law
cause of action for bad faith did not regulate insurance and therefore was not
rescued by the savings clause of ERISA and that Congress intended ERISA's
civil enforcement scheme to be exclusive).
77. See Cepelewicz, supra note 66, at 583; see also Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l
Health Plan Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 299 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that when HMOs
administer employer-funded plans, ERISA preempts state claims); Corcoran v.
United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1322 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding ERISA
preempts a state-law malpractice claim); Settles v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 927
F.2d 505, 509-10 (10th Cir., 1991) (holding ERISA preempts claims for wrongful
death based on termination of coverage); Natalie Zellner, Duking it Out:
Beating the Complete Preemption of ERISA under Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare,
Inc., 14 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 925, 926 (1998).
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court, notably traditional negligence (malpractice) claims,
were instead preempted by ERISA and removed to federal
court"8 where no meaningful remedy existed."9 Under
section 502(a), a participant can bring suit against the plan
only to recover denied benefits or enforce rights under the
plan." Remedies traditionally available in state court have
no corollaries under ERISA.
In 1995, the Supreme Court signaled a retreat from a
very broad interpretation of the "relates to" language by
finding "pre-emption stops short of [reaching] 'any law of
any State which regulates insurance.' ""' The Court further
stated that any claim of preemption had to begin with the
assumption that Congress did not intend to replace areas
historically of state concern.8" Thus, the limits on
preemption, albeit still no one's prince, were born.
Thereafter, courts increasingly appeared to consider the
statute's original intent of beneficiary protection rather
than rely solely on the plain language.83
78. See Zellner, supra note 77, at 925.
79. Under ERISA, no tort, compensatory, contractual, or punitive damages
are available. Only equitable relief can be obtained. See ERISA §
502(a)(3),(5),(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(3),(5),(8); Easley, supra note 67, at 300;
Payne, supra note 15, at 67.
80. See ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B); see also David Trueman, As Managed Care
Plans Increase, How Can Patients Hold HMOs Liable for Their Actions? 71 N.Y.
ST. B. J. 6, 8 (Feb. 1999) (stating under 502(a) remedies are limited to recovery
of benefits due, enforcement of plan rights, clarification of rights to future
benefits).
81. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 651 (1995) (finding no ERISA preemption of
state law that places indirect costs on ERISA plans because the law did not
relate to employee benefit plans as they mandated neither the benefits nor the
structure of an ERISA plan); see also DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical
Servs. Fund, 117 S. Ct. 1747, 1748 (1997) (by looking beyond the text of § 514(a)
and looking to the objectives of ERISA, the court held ERISA did not preempt
the application of a state tax on gross receipts for patient services at centers
owned and operated by ERISA plans because without exclusively affecting
ERISA plans it could not "make reference to" them and because the intent of
ERISA was not that every state law which had an effect on an employee benefit
plan should be preempted); California Div. of Labor Stds. Enforcement v.
Dillingham Constr., N.A., 117 S. Ct. 832, 839 (1997) (holding because
California's prevailing wage law was one of general applicability not affecting
only ERISA plans and it neither made reference to nor had connection with
ERISA plans, it therefore did not "relate to" an ERISA plan and was not
preempted).
82. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 647.
83. See, e.g., Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 646 (7th Cir. 1995), amended,
reh'g denied en ban, sub nom. Rice v. Kanu, 1995 U.S. App. Lexis 0-31419 (7th
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1. Negligence actions. Also in 1995, federal courts
further chipped away the immunity ERISA provides MCOs
against negligence claims by continuing to differentiate
between "partial" preemption and complete preemption.84
Whenever state claims are based upon the benefits
themselves, including enforcement, recovery, or
clarification, section 502(a)(1)(B) provides for complete
preemption, and the case properly belongs in a federal
court. However, if an action is not preempted under
section 502, the federal court must remand the case to state
court to determine if the claim is preempted under ERISA's
section 514(a).86 With the narrower concept of "relates to"
defined under New York State Conference of, Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.," policyholders
increased their chances of having a state court hear their
claim and hold MCOs accountable for negligent acts.88
Direct liability9 claims against MCOs responsible for
Cir. 1995) (holding medical malpractice claim against a physician and an HIMO
were not preempted); Pacificare, Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 153 (10th Cir.
1995) (holding that medical malpractice claim against MCO was not
preempted); Dukes v. U.S. HealthCare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (1995) (finding medical
malpractice claims against an HMO were not preempted); Moscovitch v.
Danbury Hosp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 74, 82-83 (D. Conn. 1998) (holding that HMOs
can be sued in Connecticut state court for negligence based on poor quality of
care).
84. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 352 (disallowing the removal of medical
malpractice claims against an HVIO from state court); see also, e.g., Rice, 65
F.3d at 638 (holding medical malpractice claim against a physician and an
HMO did not fall under "complete" preemption by ERISA); Pacificare, 59 F.3d
at 153 (holding that medical malpractice claim against MCO could not be
removed to federal court); Moscovitch, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 82-83 (holding that
HMOs can be sued in Connecticut for negligence based on poor quality of care).
85. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 354 (citing Labor Management Relations Act of
1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947)); see also Trueman, supra note 80, at 8 (stating §
502 does not preempt claims for malpractice, vicarious liability, or the quality of
benefits).
86. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 354-55; Trueman, supra note 80, at 8 (stating
managed care companies have attempted to use the general preemption of § 514
to evade liability, but asserting malpractice claims "relate to" ERISA plans).
87. 514 U.S. 645 (1995) (holding that Congress did not choose to displace
general health-care regulation at the state level).
88. See id. at 661-62. See also Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d
332, 340 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that when a plaintiff deletes completely
preempted federal claims to change the forum from federal to state court, it is
not forum manipulation, but rather "a legitimate attempt to try... state law
claims in the forum of... choice."); Nealy v. US Healthcare HMO, 93 N.Y.2d
209 (1999) (finding claims of medical malpractice against an HMO physician
did not relate to an employee benefit plan and were therefore not preempted by
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decisions regarding participants' care and benefits have
universally been removed from and not remanded to state
courts. 0 However, vicarious liability9' claims, such as
holding MCOs liable for the negligence of their
participating physicians, have not always been preempted."
The difficulty arises because managed care organizations
ERISA); Blaine v. Community Health Plan, 687 N.Y.S.2d 854 (Sup. Ct. 1998)
(finding state causes of action against an HMO are preempted only if they are
sued in their capacity as administrators).
89. Actions for direct liability could be brought under theories of corporate
negligence or as liability arising from cost-containment and utilization review
systems. See Easley, supra note 67, at 305.
90. See Zellner, supra note 77, at 928 (quoting Chrys A. Martin,
Developments in Managed Care, SA93 ALI-ABA 217, 221 (1996)); see also
Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that
wrongful death claims were preempted by ERISA because the plan accused was
involved in benefit determinations, recognizing ERISA preemption left
participants without meaningful remedies); Rodriguez v. Pacificare of Tex., Inc.,
980 F.2d 1014, 1016-17 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding ERISA preempted state law
claim against HMO for failing to provide prompt and adequate medical
coverage); Kuhl v. Lincoln Natl Health Plan of Kan. City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298
(8th Cir. 1993) (holding that ERISA preempted claims against HMO for failing
to approve heart surgery for so long that the subscriber required a heart
transplant and died while waiting on the list while acknowledging that
Congress might not have envisioned preapproval processes of employee welfare
plans when ERISA was enacted, but that it was up to Congress, not the courts,
to correct the problem); Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129, 132 (9th Cir.
1993) (holding that seeking wrongful death damages rather than plan benefits
was still preempted); Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th
Cir. 1992) (holding that ERISA preempted wrongful death action for failing to
provide adequate benefit coverage); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316, 318
(D.N.J. 1993) (preempting vicarious malpractice claim against HMO based on
physician's error).
91. Actions for vicarious liability could be brought under theories of
respondeat superior or ostensible agency. See Easley, supra note 67, at 303-04.
92. See Easley, supra note 67, at 302; Zellner, supra note 77, at 929-30.
Compare, e.g., Butler v. Wu, 853 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1994) (finding ERISA
preempted state law claims sounding in vicarious liability against MCOs), with
Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding
alleged vicarious liability claims against managed care organization not
preempted); Pacificare of Okla., Inc., 59 F.3d 151, 155 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding
ERISA did not preempt a medical malpractice claim against an HMO alleged to
be vicariously liable for the malpractice of its physician); Chaghervand v.
Carefirst, 909 F. Supp. 304, 311 (D. Md. 1995) (holding vicarious liability claim
against HMO was not preempted); Kearney v. U.S. Healthcare Inc., 859 F.
Supp. 182, 185-86 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding vicarious liability claim against
HMO for holding out physician as its employee and misleading subscriber was
not preempted); Elsesser v. Hospital of Phila. College of Osteopathic Med., 802
F. Supp. 1286, 1292 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding ERISA does not preempt vicarious
liability claim against MCOs for the negligence of their physicians).
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have intertwined medical and financial functions so
thoroughly that differentiating vicarious from direct
liability claims can be difficult.93 Generally, if a claim
challenges the amount of benefits received or how benefits
are administered, preemption is likely.9 4 However, if a claim
challenges the quality of the health care provided, ERISA is
less likely to preempt traditional state claims."
The difference between quality and quantity, however,
has not been consistently accepted or applied by the
courts." Under Dukes v. U.S. HealthCare, Inc.,97 complete
preemption of vicarious liability claims is unlikely because
such a complaint does not usually involve the enforcement,
recovery, or clarification of benefits.98 However, the Court in
Dukes expressed the concern that cases could arise in which
quality was so inferior that the care rendered would simply
not qualify as health care at all,99 converting the claim to
one concerning benefits, thus resulting in preemption and
inadequate remedies.' The court in Ricci v. Gooberman.°.
found distinctions between vicarious and direct liability
claims to be unsatisfactory and held that all malpractice
claims against a managed care organization were
preempted. 102 Whatever the test or result, preemption
creates perverse incentives against the interests of ERISA
plan members for whom the benefits were created, and
gives unintended rewards to MCOs by allowing them to
93. See Mariner, supra note 34, at 864.
94. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S.
125, 125-33 (1992) (holding municipal law requiring employer to provide health
insurance while on workers' compensation comparable to while working was
preempted).
95. See Ouellette v. The Christ Hosp., 942 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Ohio 1996)
(holding that a plaintiffs complaint that the HIO made her physician
discharge her too early was not preempted because it was a claim challenging
the quality of benefits she received, not the amount); Dearmas v. Av-Med, Inc.,
865 F. Supp 816 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (holding that an HMO was vicariously liable
for the negligence of its physician); Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875 F.
Supp. 544 (S.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that medical malpractice claim based on an
HMO doctor's substandard care was not preempted); Independence HMO, Inc.
v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that an HMO was liable for
a physician's negligence under an ostensible agency theory).
96. See Easley, supra note 67, at 303.
97. 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995).
98. See Zellner, supra note 77, at 929.
99. See 57 F.3d 350, 358 (3d Cir. 1995).
100. See id.
101. 840 F. Supp. 316, 317 (D.N.J. 1993).
102. See id.; see also Easley, supra note 67, at 313.
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avoid liability when they offer substandard care. Given the
inconsistent decisions of negligence actions, injured parties
often are deprived of remedies. The lack of accountability
leaves MCOs with no incentives to improve care. Randomly
kissing frogs is an unlikely way to find a prince.
Judge Birch offered compelling thoughts when he
expressed dissatisfaction at the majority's decision in
Sanson v. General Motors Corp.,10' where the court found
ERISA preempted a state law permitting fraudulent
misrepresentation claims while knowing no remedy existed
in federal court:
I do not subscribe to the view that for every wrong there must
necessarily be a remedy. However, where there is a remedy (here a
state fraud action), I find it is difficult to comprehend, in a
common sense way, how a law enacted to protect the very class of
individuals into which the appellant squarely fits can be construed
to deny him such a preexisting remedy.an 
s
a. Contract theories of recovery. State common law
contract claims asserted for an ERISA beneficiary typically
allege either breach of contract or breach of promise to pay
benefits that are due and owing.0 5 Contractual theories of
recovery also include a warranty of a particular standard of
care implied in a contract term or marketing materials,
breach of good faith and fair dealing, adhesion, and
unconscionability. 6 Even though generally preempted, a
cause of action in contract may offer several advantages to
beneficiaries of employee plans. First, the statute of
limitations for contract actions is usually longer than tort
actions.' '7 Second, an MCO subscriber may actually be more
likely to incur a contractual breach than a true tort
injury,0 8 related at least in part to the difficulty of legally
characterizing an MCO's benefit decision as a medical
decision.' 9  Third, contract theories of recovery are
103. 966 F.2d 618, 623 n.2 (11th Cir. 1992) (Birch, J., dissenting).
104. Id.
105. See Howard Shapiro, ERISA Preemption: What You Need to Know
About the Recent Supreme Court Decisions, T97EPRB A.B.A.-LEGAL EDUC. 41
(1997).
106. See Sarnacki, supra note 22, at 136-46.
107. See id. at 129.
108. See id. at 131.
109. See id. Many commentators recognize that prospective utilization
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particularly desirable to expand consumer rights".. because,
as previously noted, the employee often has no choice in the
health plan available."' Contract actions could help effect
change, recover damages preempted by ERISA if brought as
tort actions, increase negotiating power, and protect
employee rights."' Contract actions also offer the advantage
of focusing on the terms of the contract itself, thus avoiding
possibly unhelpful comparisons to the undesirable standard
practice of other MCOs that a negligence action might
require."' Importantly, damages could include pecuniary
loss; recovery for lost earning capacity, pain and suffering,
and mental distress; loss of enjoyment of life; cost of future
care; and punitive damages."
Generally, however, contract claims against employer-
sponsored welfare plans have been preempted" 5 Because
contract claims are commonly directed at the benefits
themselves, ERISA preemption occurs whenever the courts
find the claims "relate to" an employee welfare plan. Claims
of breach of contract most often arise out of handling or
processing"6 of benefits, which are preempted." ' Because of
review creates overlap between decisions about medical care and benefits. See,
e.g., Jeffrey E. Shuren, Legal Accountability for Utilization Review in ERISA
Health Plans, 77 N.C. L. REV. 731 (1999).
110. See Sarnacki, supra note 22 at 132.
111. See Clifford, supra note 11, at 8; Johnson, supra note 11, at 1638.
112. See Sarnacki, supra note 22, at 137-46.
113. See id. at 134.
114. See id. at 135.
115. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1987)
(holding intent of Congress requires preemption); Schachner v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 77 F.3d 889, 896-98 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding state law claims for
breach of contract and tort claim for bad faith refusal to pay insurance claim
were both preempted); Dranchak v. Akzo Nobel Inc., 88 F.3d 457, 459 (7th Cir.
1996) (holding that a breach of contract claim seeking to continue benefits was
preempted); Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1505 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
claims for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation were preempted);
Miller v. Taylor Insulation Co., 39 F.3d 755, 760-61 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding
breach of contract claim for coverage under health insurance was preempted).
116. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 n.4 (1987) (holding
that a state lawsuit asserting improper processing of benefit claims is
preempted because the cause of action did not include the regulation of
insurance within the meaning of the savings clause); Spain v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 11 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that wrongful death claim related to
plan's delay in authorizing high dose chemotherapy and autologous bone
marrow transplant was preempted because it arose out of administration by an
ERISA plan).
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the close relationship of contract claim to the plan, ERISA
is likely to preempt the cause of action and leave the
consumer with inadequate remedies. Despite the legal
benefits a contract cause of action could offer to subscribers,
ERISA thus far has assured that this route also does not
reveal a prince.
b. Due process rights and appeals processes. Congress
has mandated that employee benefit plans must provide a
reasonable claims procedure118 and that every employee
benefit plan must provide notice to any beneficiary whose
claim has been denied."' Furthermore, benefit plans must
provide participants a reasonable opportunity for a full and
fair review of an adverse benefit determination.' The goal
of these regulations is hampered, however, by the lack of
sanctions against those ERISA plans that fail to provide
full and fair reviews of adverse benefit determinations.
Initial review of a claim can take from three to six
months, 22 an apparently problematic time period for a
patient requiring prompt treatment. If a claim is denied, an
ERISA plan is required to inform the beneficiary of the
specific reason(s) for the denial, specify plan provisions that
support the denial, relay information necessary for the
beneficiary to perfect a claim including why the requested
information is required, and list appropriate appeal steps to
be taken to obtain a review." All claimants are entitled to
request a review of their claim,' to review relevant
documents, and to make comments in writing. 25 The second
117. See Dukes v. U.S. HealthCare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 354 (1995) (citing 29
U.S.C. § 185 (1947)).
118. See Rules and Regulations for Administration and Enforcement Under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (1999);
Marcia S. Wagner, Participant's Rights for Administrative Claims Procedure,
SC06 A.L.I.-A.BA 289 (1997). To be reasonable, a claims procedure must be
described in the summary plan description, not contain any provision or be
administered to unduly inhibit processing of claims, and provide for claimants
to receive in a timely manner written notice of time limits of the succeeding
stages of an appeals procedure. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(b)(1)(iv).
119. See ERISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1974).
120. See Wagner, supra note 118, at 292.
121. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(a).
122. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(e)(3).
123. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(f).
124. The ability to request a review usually remains open only 60 days from
receipt of denial. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)(1)(i).
125. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(1).
1507
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
stage of a claim denial review, which can consume another
two months,126 is still conducted by a plan administrator or
the insurance company, not by an independent reviewer.
12 7
Although ERISA does not require a participant to
utilize the claims procedure," the courts have generally
required plan members to exhaust a plan's claims
procedures before they may seek judicial relief.9 For
claimants requiring prompt medical treatment whose
appeals in these early stages can only be heard by the
entity making the initial denial, adherence to the
exhaustion requirement burdens the subscriber by adding
critical time to the determination process-all without likely
changing the outcome. However, when complaints assert
multiple theories of action on a common core of facts, the
courts are less likely to expect complete exhaustion of the
review process. 3 ' Also, if the procedure process appears
futile, or if meaningful access to review is denied, courts
may refuse to apply the exhaustion doctrine. 3'
Nevertheless, courts can remand complaints to the plan's
review process or even dismiss the complaint altogether
with prejudice.'32
Without effective strategies to reform, implement, and
enforce appeals processes, .plan enrollees may possess
promises more than rights.' One crucial factor is that
because physician support and participation is important to
the success of any appeal, any conflicts of interest between
a patient's provider and the patient's MCO can negatively
affect an appeal. For instance, an important conflict arises
when MCOs offer financial incentives to providers that may
encourage them to limit care or services to their patients,
not advocate for them. Of potentially more significance is if
an MCO is actually the providers' employer, creating a
conflict for providers between the need to advocate for their
patients and protect the financial interests of their
126. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(3).
127. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(1), (2).
128. See id.
129. See Wagner, supra note 118, at 296.
130. See id. at 298.
131. See Janowski v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local No. 710 Pension
Fund, 673 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1982).
132. See Wagner, supra note 118, at 300-01.
133. See Tracey E. Miller, Center Stage on the Patient Protection Agenda:
Grievance and Appeal Rights, 26 J. LAW, IED. & ETIcs 89-90 (1998).
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employer.'13
Furthermore, the mere existence of regulations
mandating and plan policies providing for appeals processes
do not ensure effective implementation. For instance, one
study found that 66% of HMOs distributed incomplete or
inaccurate information about appeals processes.'35 Another
study found that 44% of HMOs in New York State failed to
comply with requirements to provide information about
patient rights.3 6 The courts also have found violations of
regulatory standards for appeals processes.' For Medicare
patients, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
Health Care Financing Administration has a legal
obligation to terminate its contract with any HMO that fails
to comply with apgeals processes protecting beneficiaries'
due process rights. ' However, it remains to be seen if this
decision provides a powerful incentive to MCOs because
violations would result in the loss of a significant number of
subscribers, or rather if it would provide a welcome relief to
MCOs since it would eliminate a costly group of their
subscribers who consume expensive health-care services.'39
Procedural steps alone do not assure that enrollees
have meaningful access to genuine appeals processes.
Timely independent and external reviewr4 and relevant,
134. See id. at 90.
135. See id. (stating most enrollees have no choice of plan) (quoting Office of
Inspector General, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Medicare
HMO Appeal and Grievance Processes, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 1996).
136. See Henry L. Davis, 44% of HMOs Fail to Meet State Standards, BUFF.
NEWS, Nov. 19, 1998, at D1.
137. See, e.g., Grijalva v. Shalala, 946 F. Supp. 747 (D. Ariz. 1996), affid, 152
F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding due process rights of Medicare beneficiaries
were denied by a deficient appeals process); Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group,
Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 913 (Cal. 1997) (finding lengthy delays and lack of
compliance with appeals process requirements).
138. See Miller, supra note 133, at 97 (citing Grijalva, 946 F. Supp. at 758).
139. See generally Jerome P. Kassirer, Doctor Discontent, 339 NEw ENG. J.
IED. 1543 (1998) (commenting that poorly designed incentive arrangements
might tempt physicians to shun sick patients).
140. An argument often raised by MCOs against external review is that the
cost would be significant and result in fewer benefits or higher premiums, or
even both. However, one estimate found that the annual cost per enrollee would
be only about $1.20. See Coopers & Lybrand, Estimated Cost Effect of Provisions
of Consumer Protection Proposals by the President's Advisory Commission and
the Patient Access to Responsible Care Act (Kaiser Family Foundation, Apr.
1998). Many managed care organizations are beginning to support external
review as a way to possibly avoiding legislation approving malpractice liability
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useful information are among the most important
components of the appeals process. But without incentives
for MCOs to comply with and subscribers to use appeals
processes, they are unlikely to provide meaningful
consumer protection. Current appeals processes can present
other disadvantages, also. Unless plans are required to
make the results of benefit determinations open and
accessible to plan participants, one person's successes could
remain just that." Everyone with a similar claim would
start from scratch without the benefit of legal precedent
that a court-based remedy would provide.
Another important consideration in the appeals process
is the ability of consumers to use it effectively. Literacy and
primary language barriers" are significant among lower
socioeconomic groups and native-speaking ethnic groups,
making utilization of appeals processes difficult, if not
nearly impossible. Rural and elderly subscribers may find
any necessary travel a significant barrier to effective
participation in appeals. The process also assumes a
subscriber's health is good enough to permit participation
in the appeals process, which may not be the case for an
enrollee with a catastrophic illness such as a traumatic
against them. See Mitchel Benson, Rivals Question Motives in Battle Over HMO
Rules, WALL ST. J., July 29, 1998, at CA2 (stating managed care industry is
supporting external review process of claims denials as a way to head off
liability); Mitchel Benson, HMO Critics Ask: Is Zelman Selling Out?, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 9, 1998, at CAI (stating insurers have supported external reviews as a
"less-onerous alternative to liability legislation"); Rhonda L. Rundle, External
Review of HMO Decisions Becomes Hot Issue, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1998, at B2
(stating HMOs are now embracing outside review of adverse benefit
determinations as a way to possible forestall malpractice suits).
141. See, e.g., Final Draft, Comments to HCFA re: Medicaid Managed Care
Regs, http'//www.familiesusa.org/novl3.htm, (collected Mar. 1, 1999 18:05:00
EST) (on file with the author and with BUFF. L. REV.) (stating in comments to
the Department of Labor that plaintiffs should be entitled reasonable access to
records concerning similar claims in determination disputes). Arbitration
mandated by clauses commonly buried deep in the fine print of an insurance
contract, similarly prevent one person's successful ruling from benefiting other
beneficiaries. See Ray Rivera, Life or Death? In Some Insurance Disputes, It
Can Be Up to an Arbitrator, SALT LAKE TRIB., July 11, 1999, at Al.
142. See Final Draft, supra note 141 (calling for acceptance of oral
complaints in lieu of written appeals for those who choose).
143. See Marc A. Rodwin, Consumer Protection and Managed Care: Issues,
Reform Proposals, and Trade-Offs, 32 Hous. L. REv. 1319, 1348-49 (1996); see
also Trueman, supra note 80, at 27 (stating "arduous and lengthy" appeals
processes may not be successful and ultimately leave enrollees 'njured or
deceased because of the length of the process").
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injury, cardiovascular accident, or advanced cancer. While
family members could act as surrogates in an appeals
process, not all plan participants will have family or friends
who are capable or willing to take on this role.
Appeals processes may be illusory and alone do not
guarantee consumers will have proper protections. In fact,
if improperly structured, they may be an impediment to
effective remedies by creating only illusionary remedies
upon which the courts rely.
2. Federal legislative initiatives. Congress made three
major amendments to ERISA in 1996 to address the needs
of working Americans and their families when they change
jobs, have children, or require mental health care.' While
all three amendments provide important new protections,
they continue to leave other important areas unaddressed.
Amending ERISA with three different acts, Congress
sought to provide consumer protections that address some
of the major criticisms of ERISA. The Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)45 was enacted
to protect both working Americans and their dependents
who have preexisting medical conditions and therefore
encounter difficulties in obtaining health-care coverage
when they change employers. HIPAA regulates many of the
features of an employee health plan related to waiting
periods and preexisting conditions, but it falls far short of
solving coverage issues for all employees, especially for
those who have not changed jobs. 46 Congress also enacted
The Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act
(NMHPA) in 1996." Concerns about forced early discharge
of newborns and their mothers prompted its enactment.
Under NMHPA, group health plans, HMOs and insurance
companies, including those regulated by ERISA, cannot
mandate a mother and newborn be discharged sooner than
48 hours after a normal vaginal delivery or 96 hours after a
144. 29 U.S.C. § 1181(a)-(g) (1996); 29 U.S.C. § 1185 (1996); 29 U.S.C. §
1185(a) (1996).
145. 29 U.S.C. § 1181(a)-(g) (1996).
146. HIPAA has no provisions for what an employee health plan must
provide. Consider the case where, after discovering that an employee had AIDS,
the employer-sponsored health plan was changed to limit AIDS-related claims
to a lifetime maximum of $5,000. See McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401
(5th Cir. 1991).
147. Enacted on Sept. 26, 1996.
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cesarean section birth.14 The Mental Health Parity Act
(MHPA) also amends ERISA to require that annual or
lifetime dollar limits on mental health benefits of employee
health plans cannot be less than those dollar amounts
provided for medical and surgical benefits.' But none of
these Acts requires an employer to offer health benefits at
all. Nothing prevents an employer from dropping health
benefits altogether, or other types of coverage selectively,
an outcome made more likely if the new mandated coverage
is perceived to significantly increase an employer's costs.
Members of Congress have attempted to fill the
regulatory gap that has resulted from the implementation
of ERISA in still other ways. Congressman Norwood
proposed an amendment to ERISA, the Patient Access to
Responsible Care Act of 1997 (PARCA)' Among its most
important provisions, the bill assured access to specialists,
created standards for appeals and grievances, established a
prudent layperson standard for emergency services,
eliminated provider incentive plans that induce a provider
to reduce or limit services to a specific enrollee, and
permitted subscribers to hold health plans legally
accountable for malpractice. 5' Congressmen Dingell and
Gephardt..2 and Senators Daschle and Kennedy5 also
proposed amendments to establish protections for MCO
subscribers. The bills would also have assured access to
specialists, including obstetrical and gynecological care for
women; established standards for appeals and grievances
with even more rigorous time frames; prohibited denial of
care in clinical trials if no standard treatment was
available; created a prudent layperson standard for
emergency services; permitted subscribers to hold health
plans accountable for malpractice; assured access to
necessary non-formulary prescription medications, and
even would have created whistle-blower protections for
professionals who report poor quality care.
The House of Representatives defeated this bill,
148. 29 U.S.C. § 1185 (1996).
149. 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (1996). See William F. Highberger, Current
Developments in Employment Law: Material On Health Care Law, SD06 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 395 (1998).
150. S. 644, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997).
151. See S. 644, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997).
152. See H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. (1997).
153. See S. 1890, 105th Cong. (1997).
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however, on July 24, 1998, and in its place passed the
Republican-sponsored Patient Protection Act.14 While the
Republican bill provided some consumer protections such as
direct access to obstetrical and gynecological care and
prohibitions on "gag clauses,"'55 it provided very weak
appeals and grievance processes and more importantly,
omitted a subscriber's right to hold an MCO responsible for
negligent care."'
Ultimately, the 105th Congress adjourned without
enacting any of this patient's rights legislation. What, if
any, bill will be enacted in the future remains a mystery.'57
Nevertheless, Congress must be very careful not to hastily
enact legislation in response to public pressure for MCO
reform. Enacting legislation that omits important consumer
benefits or induces employers to drop health insurance
coverage altogether could make a bad situation even worse.
"Kissing a pig" is no way to find a prince.
3. State legislative initiatives. The states have also
154. H.R. 4250, 105th Cong. (1997).
155. Gag clauses, included in contracts written by managed care
organizations, prohibit providers from informing patients about alternative care
that an MCO does not cover, is opposed to, or does not want a patient to know
about. See Trueman, supra note 80, at 27.
156. See H.R. 4250, 105th Congress, (1997).
157. At the time this Comment went to press, so far in 1999, Congress, Rep.
Norwood has reintroduced his bill as H.R. 216, 106th Cong. (1999); Rep. Dingell
and Sen. Daschle have introduced their legislation as H.R. 358, 106th Cong.
1999 and S. 6, 106th Cong. (1999); and the Republicans leadership has
introduced its bills as H.R. 448, 106th Cong. (1999) and S. 300, 106th Cong.
(1999). As of August 1999, House Speaker Hastert "open[ed] the way for
consideration of a GOP proposal that would allow a limited right for patients to
sue HIMOs over care denials." What's News, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1999, at Al.
Rep. Hastert's efforts may be an "attempt to deal with a burgeoning revolt
among Republican lawmakers who favor tough regulation of HIMOs." Hastert to
Allow Tougher HMO Bill to Move Forward, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 9, 1999, at C21.
A new , bipartisan bill compromise contains a variety of consumer protections
such as increased access to specialists and emergency care and the right to sue
a health plan in state court. A large part of the compromise lies in the provision
that insurers who comply with treatment decisions of external reviewers are
not subject to punitive damages. See Laurie McGinley, GOP Faction Joins
Democrats on Patients'Bill, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 6, 1999, at A4. Republicans have
arrested Democratic efforts to include the 48 million subscribers in employer's
self-insured plans who currently have not even the few protections states have
been able to pass that regulate health insurance companies directly. See Laurie
McGinley & Shailagh Murray, Democrats' Patient-Protection Measures Fail in
Senate, WALL. ST. J., July 14, 1999, at B2.
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enacted legislation to fill ERISA's regulatory void given
that federal attempts to correct the gap have fallen short.
In 1996 alone, more than 1,000 bills were introduced in
state legislatures to regulate and reform MCOs.'58 Among
the most closely watched pieces of state legislation in 1997
was the Texas Health Care Liability Act.'59 The Act
contained several popular provisions, including allowing
individuals to bring suits against MCOs for damages
proximately caused by an MCO's failure to exercise
ordinary care when making health-care treatment
decisions.6 ' The Act also created an independent review
process for adverse benefit determinations."'
Health plans and insurers in Texas sought a
declaratory judgment claiming ERISA preempted the Texas
Health Care Liability Act.'62 The district court found ERISA
did not preempt the provision permitting patients to sue
MCOs, even though ERISA did preempt the provision
creating an independent review process for adverse benefit
determinations.' The court reasoned that the provision
related to independent review was not saved from
preemption by the insurance savings clause since it failed a
prong of the Metropolitan Life test. The test requires that
the legislative provisions be limited to entities within the
insurance industry, which the Court found did not include
158. See Michele M. Garvin, Health Maintenance Organizations, in HEALTH
CARE CORPORATE LAW: MANAGED CARE (M. Hall & W. Brewbaker eds., 1996).
The author gives the American Medical Association's legislative initiative
known as the "Patient Protection Act" credit for much of this flood of bills. Id.
159. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 88.001-88.003 (West 1999).
160. See id. § 88.002(a), (b). For example, if an MCO determined that a plan
participant did not need coronary bypass surgery, the Act would consider this a
medical decision, not just a benefit determination. In 1999, Georgia also passed
legislation allowing patients to sue their HMO for adverse benefit
determinations. See Molly Tschida, Paying the Price: Georgia OKs Malpractice
Suits Against HMOs, MOD. PHYS., May 1, 1999, at 9.
161. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.003(c) (West 1999).
162. See Corporate Health Ins. Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d 597
(S.D. Tex. 1998).
163. See id.
164. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 741-47
(1985) (creating a test where first the statute in question must meet the
common sense definition of insurance regulation and then second, must look at
three factors, (a) whether the practice has the effect of spreading policyholders'
risk, (b) whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship
between the insurer and the insured, and (c) whether the practice is limited to
entities within the insurance industry).
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MCOs. 65
Notwithstanding preemption of review processes, the
court determined that the provision making managed care
entities liable for substandard health-care treatment
decisions was not preempted by ERISA. First, the court
considered the definition of an ERISA plan and determined
that the Act expressly regulated health insurance carriers,
HMOs, and MCOs, not the ERISA plans of employers or
employee organizations. 66  Next the Court evaluated
whether the Act "relates to" an ERISA plan, and concluded
without further analysis that it regulated medical decisions
of health insurance carriers, HMOs, and MCOs that,
because health and insurance are areas traditionally
occupied by the states, were not preempted.'67 The Court
then determined that the Act did not have a "reference to"
168
or "connection with""69 ERISA plans, stating that the Act
focused on quality of benefits, not on quantity (that could
trigger preemption).Y7
Other states also have enacted legislation aimed at
improving patient care under MCOs. For example, Georgia
and New York prohibit HMOs from requiring prior
authorization for emergency care under the "prudent
layperson" definition. 7' This definition of an emergency
simply requires that a prudent layperson, not a medical
professional, would recognize that the health condition for
which a subscriber is seeking treatment is an emergency. A
few states such as New York require MCOs to refer
employee-subscribers out-of-plan if the network does not
have a specialist with appropriate training and expertise.'72





170. See id. at 617.
171. See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-11-81; CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (West 1999); NY
Ins. § 3216; Families USA, HMO Consumers at Risk: States to the Rescue,
http'I/www.familiesusa.org/farisk.html (collected Oct. 11, 1998, 15:29:00 EST)
(on file with the author and with BUFF. L. REv.). It is important to note that in
many areas, emergency rooms are now filled with HMO subscribers (up to 20%
of patients seen) who cannot get care from busy, overbooked primary care
physicians-hardly a cost-cutting measure. See Nancy Ann Jeffrey, Health Care:
Who's Crowding E.R.s Now? Managed-Care Patients, WALL ST. J., July 20,
1999, at BI.
172. See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-11-81 (1999); CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (West
1999); NY Ins. § 3216; Families USA, HMO Consumers at Risk: States to the
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Some states with more rural populations, such as Maine,'73
have enacted legislation directed at improving access to
care by decreasing the distances people are required to
travel to find a provider in their MCO's network.74
How these state acts will survive future ERISA
preemption challenges remains to be determined. If ERISA
preemption continues to thwart states' legislative attempts
to improve health-care delivery, it will make the states'
efforts meaningless in most instances. If state legislative
efforts are ineffective, current piecemeal federal legislation
will not provide adequate protection to all participants
regardless of their particular health problem. Narrowly
focused federal legislation addresses only a few of the
problems created by preempting the state's traditional role
of managing health and insurance matters without
effectively confronting its broad consequences.17
4. Department of Labor and its proposed regulations.
The Department of Labor threw its hat into the ring on
September 9, 1998, when it proposed regulations revising
the minimum requirements for benefit claims procedures
under ERISA."75 The proposals appear strongly favorable to
employee-beneficiaries, reflecting the directive from
President Clinton that ERISA plan enrollees have processes
and rights consistent with the Patient Bill of Rights. 7' The
proposed regulations include: (1) more responsive time
deadlines for decisions, (2) greater consideration of emer-
Rescue, http://www.familiesusa.orglfarisk.html (collected Oct. 11, 1998,
15:29:00 EST) (on file with the author and with BUFF. L. REV.).
173. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 24-A, § 2673 (West 1998).
174. See id.
175. See Mariner, supra note 46, at 1989; see also Robert Kuttner, The
Whole Point of Health Insurance, http://epn.org/kuttner/bk980715.htm,
(collected Mar. 1, 1999, 17:50:00 EST) (on file with the author and with BUFF. L.
REV.).
176. See Department of Labor, Proposed Rules: Pension and Welfare
Benefits Administration, 63 Fed. Reg. 48,390 (1998).
177. See id. at 48,392 n.3. The President's Advisory Commission on
Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry created a report
articulating, among other things, the right of all "health care consumers"
(including participants and beneficiaries in group health plans covered by
ERISA) "to a fair and efficient process for resolving differences with their health
plans, health-care providers, and the institutions that serve them, including a
rigorous system of internal review and an independent system of external
review." Id. at 48,391.
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gencies 7 8 (3) new disclosure requirements about benefit
eligibility, 9 (4) new notice requirements about fair and
timely consideration of claims and appeals, (5) new
standards for full and fair appeals,8 ° and (6) sanctions for
MCOs that fail to create or follow reasonable claims
procedures.' The remedies provided, however, appear
limited to equitable relief without additional incentives
such as punitive damages and damages reasonably flowing
from the breach of fiduciary duty.
ERISA was not intended to give MCOs a unique status
under the law, an ability to lead a "charmed existence that
was never contemplated by Congress.""2 As already seen
with ERISA, regulatory intervention often has results
opposite to those intended.'83 Legislation and regulations
can provide solutions, but they may also be the genesis of
new problems"M if courts' interpretations result in
inadvertent exclusions and unintentional inclusions.
The proposed regulations are unlikely to survive the
comment period 8 without major revisions designed to
make them more palatable to MCOs that fear the financial
consequences of employers' threats to drop health-care
coverage altogether. If not well constructed, however, new
Department of Labor regulations could create additional
problems by limiting enrollees' rights to only those
enumerated. Thus far, no final regulations have been
issued.
178. See id. at 48,393-94.
179. See id. at 48,394-95.
180. See id. at 48,396-97.
181. See id. at 48,397.
182. Clifford, supra note 11, at 8.
183. See Nealy v. US Healthcare HMO, 93 N.Y.2d 209 (1999) (finding a
malpractice claim was not preempted while noting ERISA's principal object was
to protect plan participants and beneficiaries, not to harm them); David A.
Hyman, Consumer Protection in a Managed Care World: Should Consumers
Call 911?, 43 VILL. L. REv. 409,452 (1998).
184. See Hyman, supra note 183, at 458.
185. The Department of Labor conducted hearings the week of February 15,
1999, on the proposed changes in handling of appeals in employer-sponsored
health plans. See Laurie McGinley, HMO Fracas Moves to Who Makes Medical
Decisions, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 1999, at Al.
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B. Potential Current Approaches to Meaningful Remedies
Under ERISA (with and without preemption)
The advantage of putting judicial teeth into ERISA to
create meaningful remedies is that no legislative action at
the state or federal level, which has proven to be politically
difficult at best, is required. Real equity is a remedy
available in all federal courts today. The Eighth Circuit
may have opened the door a crack by finding an HlIMO
breaches its fiduciary duties when it fails to disclose
financial incentives to providers, but stopped short of
crafting a significant remedy.8 ' The broad liability and
sanctions that exist for breach of fiduciary duties under
ERISA could offset the immunity MCOs have enjoyed under
the preemption clause."8 7
1. Monetary awards in equity. Preemption would not
be the prince to MCOs and the frog to their subscriber-
patients if the remedies provided in federal court under
ERISA were not meaningless.'88 In actions under ERISA §
502 (a)(3), plan participants are limited to equitable relief,
which has been inadequate since it has been limited to the
value of the benefit denied.'89 Equitable relief, however, can
include monetary awards for restitution if justice
demands.9 ' An award limited to the value of denied benefits
is often no remedy at all when participants have suffered
186. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 297 (1997); see also Ayling, supra note 33, at 428-29.
187. See Ayling, supra note 33, at 434.
188. See generally id. at 428; see also HIPAA's addition of a new Part 7 to
ERISA (Title I, Section 101 of HIPAA) giving the possibility of attorneys' fees in
addition to recovery of required benefits and providing $100 per day fine for
failure to provide documents to participants and beneficiaries and $1,000 per
day fine for failure to file required information returns (ERISA § 734(g)).
189. See Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding that parents were not entitled to extra-contractual relief for their
malpractice claim against a utilization review company when their unborn child
died during a time period that the plan's committee denied nursing care); see
also Varity Corp v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1995) (holding individuals may
obtain equitable relief for breach of fiduciary duty under § 502(s)(3) of ERISA.).
190. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 (1987); see also Russell v.
Northrop Grumman Corp., 921 F. Supp. 143, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding
monetary damages to a beneficiary are not permissible under ERISA, but an
equitable remedy that includes lost wages is permissible if they restore a
plaintiff to his or her prior position before the breach of fiduciary duty
occurred).
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irreparable damage to their health or have died. Restitution
can offer far more. For instance, following the unnecessary
death of a participant, the savings of what should have
been spent for care could be determined, disgorged from the
MCO, and awarded to a decedent's surviving family. 9'
The Fifth Circuit in Corcoran has already stated that
equitable relief to make a plaintiff whole might well be
consistent with the trust law principles encompassed in
ERISA.92 The court referred to the Second Restatement of
Trusts stating that section 205 permits "make-whole"
monetary relief provided the remedy would put the
plaintiffs in the position they would have been in had the
trustee not committed the breach of trust.'93 The court also
relied on the Second Restatement of Contracts section 347
and Comment (a) to call for damages that could reasonably
have been foreseen to flow from the breach.'94 The court
emphasized that damages for emotional distress, that the
plaintiffs in this case sought, are not awarded for breach of
trust duties and are granted only rarely for breach of
contract.'95 The court left open the possibility that it still
may have been able to grant suitable equitable relief had
the plaintiffs asked for damages other than emotional
distress, such as restitution.9 ' In this case, forcing the
insurer to pay the Corcoran family the cost of nursing care
it had denied to Mrs. Corcoran, a high risk pregnant
beneficiary, the anticipated health costs of the fetus from
birth to adulthood, any psychological treatment of the
grieving parents, and other costs reasonably flowing from
the denial of care, may have provided significant monetary
restitution to the plaintiffs. More significantly, monetary
damages may have provided the insurer with an incentive
to provide, not deny, needed service in the future.
191. See Ayling, supra note 33, at 430 (discussing specifically Shea, 107 F.3d
625). Mr. Shea, who had complained of chest pain and had a strong family
history of heart disease, was denied a referral to a cardiologist by his primary
physician and died shortly after at age 40 of a heart attack. His wife brought
suit alleging, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duties because financial incentives
the primary physician enjoyed for not referring patients to specialists was not
disclosed to plan members. The Eighth Circuit found that MCOs can be
accountable for nondisclosure as fiduciaries. See Shea, 107 F.3d at 626-29.
192. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1336.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 1336-37.
195. See id.
196. See id. at 1337.
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2. Removal of fiduciaries. ERISA section 409(a) also
allows a court to remove any fiduciary from an ERISA plan
and correct any losses for which the plan may be found
responsible.197 Removal of the MCO as a fiduciary would
constitute a powerful sanction, and therefore a strong
incentive to make responsible decisions, potentially
imposing severe limits on an MCO's market share and even
viability. Furthermore, reimbursement of the total amount
of premiums all participants paid an MCO found to have
breached its fiduciary obligations, coupled with the cost of
attorneys' fees, 9 ' could be powerful incentives to MCOs
while offering meaningful remedies to injured parties. 99
PART III: CHALLENGES FACING HEALTH-CARE CONSUMERS IN
TODAY'S MANAGED CARE ENVIRONMENT
In a brief period of time, the type of health coverage
available to working American families has changed
significantly."' Through their employers, most working
families are currently enrolled in managed care plans;
twenty years ago the majority were covered by fee-for-
service indemnity plans."' This change in the type of health
insurance has not, however, resulted from employees
making different benefit selections. Most working families
have no choice about what plan, much less what type of
plan, they may select because their employers do not offer
an array of health insurance coverage options.0
In light of the recent change in the type of health
insurance most Americans have, it is noteworthy that
subscribers to managed care plans are generally less
satisfied overall with their health care than are members of
traditional fee-for-service plans.0 3 Perhaps even more
197. See Ayling, supra note 33, at 430.
198. Attorneys' fees could be even higher if the court determines that, inter
alia, there was a showing of bad faith and an award of attorney's fees would act
as a deterrent to other MCOs. See Egert v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 768
F. Supp. 216, 218 (N.D. EU. 1991).
199. See Ayling, supra note 33, at 430.
200. See Davis & Schoen, supra note 12 (quoting the 1997
Kaiser/Commonwealth Nation Health Insurance Survey and the 1994
Commonwealth Fund Survey of Patient Experiences with Managed Care);
Miller, supra note 133, at 89 (stating many enrollees have no choice of plan).
20L See Davis & Schoen, supra note 12.
202. See id.
203. See id.; see also Nancy Ann Jeffery & Shailagh Murray, HMOs Get Bad
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significantly, individuals who use managed care benefits
the most (because they or a family member are in poor
health) are the most dissatisfied of all."4 Unlike healthy
subscribers, those in poor health are more likely to have
encountered obstacles MCOs have become known for, such
as denials to specialists and denials of specific prescribed
drugs. Individuals who use the most health benefits express
the greatest satisfaction with fee-for-service insurance. 5
that generally provides fewer barriers to specialists,
treatments, and medications.
Americans overwhelmingly want to stop what they
perceive as abuses by managed care organizations.2 6 Most
Americans believe that MCOs care more about money than
providing the best treatment, that managed care makes it
tougher to see a specialist, and that quality of care has
deteriorated under managed care."7 Increasingly people
Reviews From Doctors; Quality Improvement Record is Uneven, WALL ST. J.,
July 29, 1999, at B6 (stating "only 5% of patients surveyed gave their health
plans an '8, 9, or 10,' the highest marks on a '1 to 10' rating scale for overall
satisfaction").
204. See Davis & Schoen, supra note 12.
205. See id.
206. See Myriam Marquez & Orlando Sentinel, Harry and Louise Take on
HMOs, FT. WORTH STAR, Aug. 2, 1998, at 9 (quoting a CNN/Time magazine
survey that found 84% of Americans want to stop HMO abuses); see also Ellen
Goodman, Is This as Good as Health Care Gets?, BuFF. NEwS, Apr. 1, 1998, at
B3 (previewing a forthcoming poll which will demonstrate that patients and
doctors "have come together in a new class of exploited people"); see generally
Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997) (describing how a 40-year-old
man died after complaining of chest pain, dizziness, and difficulty breathing to
his physician who failed to refer him to a cardiologist, allegedly related to
financial incentives the HIVIO provided the physician not to refer to specialists);
Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992) (relating the
story of an unborn child who died during the hours the mother had been denied
nursing care by her health plan); GEORGE ANDERS, HEALTH AGAINST WEALTH:
HMOs AND THE BREAKDOwN OF MEDICAL TRUST 1-13 (1996) (describing an
infant who suffered amputations of both feet and hands because his parents
were instructed by their HMO to drive him 42 miles past numerous other
hospitals thus delaying his care); Clinton Pushes to Protect Patient Rights
Under HMOs, BUFF. NEWS, May 29, 1998, at A9 (relating how Ricka Powers
appeared at the White House to tell of making 123 calls to her HMO to see a
specialist about her breast cancer); Hess, supra note 40, at H5 (discussing a 12-
year-old boy with cancer who had his leg amputated when his MCO balked at
paying for an alternative treatment that could have saved it and stating that
"poll after poll" has found the public is "increasingly frustrated with benefit and
care restrictions imposed by cost-conscious health-care managers").
207. See The HMO Backlash: Survey Finds Skepticism About Managed-Care
Motives, http'J/cnn.com/HEALTI9711/05/managed.care (posted Nov. 5, 1997
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
believe that MCOs manage costs, not care.20' This play on
words and concepts has caught the attention of health-care
consumers, physicians, attorneys, nurses, and advocacy
groups who want health-care providers, not insurance
companies, managing patient care.
With little debate, ERISA may be one of the greatest
obstacles to a health-care consumer's rights and to
improving the health outcomes of managed care. °9 The
movement to create a specific right for patients to sue a
health-care plan has led the pack of ERISA reform
strategies and created strange bedfellows.20 Nurses and
consumers are allying with physicians, and physicians in
turn are allying with attorneys.21" ' In response to MCOs
making medical decisions couched as benefit decisions,
these otherwise frequent adversaries have united behind
the need to grant a patient the right to sue a health-care
plan when negligent medical benefit decisions result in
adverse health outcomes. They argue that the right to bring
suit for negligent and unjustifiable denials of care is needed
for two reasons: (1) to compensate injured policyholders and
(2) to serve as an incentive to health insurers where little
currently exists to provide cost-effective, quality care.212
Lawsuits, however, are only a means to an end. 13
Health-care consumers may really be less interested in
suing and more interested in preventing wrongful denials
and delays in care,214 in assuring MCOs have strong
5:04 PM EST) (on file with the author and with BUFF. L. REV.).
208. See Raphael A. Rovere, M.D., A Message to HMOs: If the Shoe Fits,
Wear It, BUFF. NEWS, May 23, 1998, at B3.
209. See generally ERISA (1994). A caution to those seeking to use ERISA
as a defense in litigation: ERISA preemption is a waivable affirmative defense.
See Wolf v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 71 F.3d 444, 450 (1st. Cir 1995) (the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow the defense to
amend its pleadings). Claiming an affirmative defense of federal preemption,
however, does not itself allow removal to federal court because it is part of the
answer, not part of the complaint. See Franklin H. Williams Ins. Trust v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1995).
210. See generally Families U.S.A. Foundation, <httpJ/www.familiesusa.org>
(advocating for health-care consumers).
211. See, Goodman, supra note 206, at B3.
212. See Still a Chance for a Do-Something Congress, BUFF. NEWS, Sep. 2,
1998, at B2.
213. See Jane Bryant Quinn, No-Fault Health Insurance Would Be Ideal for
Consumers, HMOs, But Not for Lawyers, BUFF. NEWS, Aug. 26, 1998, at A12.
214. Testimony of Families U.S.A. Executive Director Ron Pollack before the
Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies
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incentives to make careful medical decisions, and in
guaranteeing that anyone harmed by an MCO should have
swift and proper compensation.
215
But "kissing a pig" is no way to find a prince, and
malpractice suits alone do not protect consumers.
Consumer protection ultimately will need to come from
many sources, through a variety of means, and especially by
careful consideration and attention to the structure of
incentives.
PART IV: IMPROVING CURRENT FINANCIAL INCENTIVES BY
CREATING INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE REGULATIONS AND
REMEDIES
A. Current Financial Incentives
Historically, under a fee-for-service system, financial
incentives encouraged physicians and institutions to
provide a maximum level of services. In other words, the
more patients that physicians cared for and the more
services they provided to each patient, the more they were
paid.216 The system provided no counterbalancing incentives
to limit health-care services to those that were most
appropriate or cost-effective.
In contrast, MCOs now structure physicians' and
hospitals' financial incentives, under capitation and other
financial schemes, to provide fewer services while taking on
more patients. Simply put, the fewer services such as
referrals to specialists and diagnostic tests that providers
utilize, and the more patients they take in, the more they
are paid. The danger arises that incentives to provide
economical care can also be incentives to provide inferior
care, or no care at all.217 Whether financial incentives to
Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee re Current Problems
with the Federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
(text from testimony given May 14, 1998) http/www.familiesusa.org/erisa2.htm
(collected Oct. 19, 1998, 14:44:00 EST) (on file with the author and BUFF. L.
REv.).
215. See Quinn, supra note 213, at A12.
216. See, e.g., Mark R. Chassin et. al., Does Inappropriate Use Explain
Geographic Variations in the Use of Healthcare Services?, 258 JAMA 1, 1-5
(1987) (study finding 17% of coronary angiographies, 32% of carotid
endarterectomies and 17% of endoscopies were not medically necessary).
217. See SYLviA LAW, BLUE CROSS: WHAT WENT WRONG? 108-09 (2d ed.
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physicians are appropriate and necessary to control health-
care costs has been the subject of much debate.218
Negligence suits provide an important counterbalance
to MCOs' financial incentive schemes that could entice
physicians to make self-serving, potentially detrimental,
health-care decisions. MCOs, however, are not subject to
the same counterbalancing incentive. As discussed above,
negligence suits for denials of care that are linked to
financial incentives are preempted by ERISA. But the issue
should not be limited to whether financial incentives should
be used to decrease health-care costs; rather, the current
debate should focus on how to structure financial incentives
to achieve both cost-effective, quality care and necessary
care. Financial incentives must be structured to assure
MCOs have the same financial incentives to provide quality
care that are imposed upon health-care providers.
Incentive schemes are common among MCOs and
continue to increase. 19 However, incentives are often
structured by financial analysis, not a health analysis of the
needs of the population served.22 Providers who care for
high risk populations such as the elderly and the poor are
at a potentially significant financial risk if they fail to
follow MCOs' incentives to limit services provided to these
medically needy populations. Financial incentives that
encourage care limitations in turn create tensions for
providers that may result in either inappropriately
withholding care or financially penalizing providers for
delivering quality health care. On a broader scale, provider
incentives designed to promote cost-effective care could
1976). Note that this danger was recognized more than 20 years ago.
218. Compare, e.g., David M. Frankford, Managing Medical Clinicians'
Work Through the Use of Financial Incentives, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 71
(1994) (arguing against physician incentives), with Mark A. Hall, Rationing
Health Care at the Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 758-776 (1994) (arguing for
carefully constructed incentives that are disclosed to patients), and David
Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less: Financial Incentives to Limit
Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 155 (1996) (arguing physician incentives can have
important cost containment benefits). Note also that the federal government
restricts incentives to Medicare and Medicaid providers. See ERISA §
502mm(i)(S)(A)(i)(1994), 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(i)(8)(A)(i)(1994).
219. See Physician Payment Rev. Comm'n PPRC Report on Changes in
Physician Practices, reprinted in Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 143, 270,
at 46, 846 (Sept. 1, 1995) (reporting almost half of all physicians polled had
assumed financial risk through a financial incentive program of one or more
health insurance plans).
220. See Farrell, supra note 35, at 252.
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become incentives to stop providing care to high risk
populations if the incentives are universally applied
without essential modifications. Given that MCOs try to
avoid insuring those with the largest health-care
consumption,22' certain high risk groups like the elderly, the
chronically ill, and the poor may become even more
medically disenfranchised.
Physicians frequently receive payment in two forms,
through basic and incentive payment schemes."' Basic
payments may be in the form of salaries, capitation, or even
fee-for-service. Incentive payments, however, generally
impact the basic payment amounts, creating strong
pressures on physicians to deliver cost-effective care23 that
may translate into a failing to (1) refer patients to
specialists, (2) order relatively expensive diagnostic testing,
or (3) provide inpatient treatment.
Incentive schemes may vary, but commonly occur as
bonuses and "withholds." 4 Bonuses provide physicians
with incentives to meet the specific goals set by the MCO as
criteria for payment.225 While bonuses are clearly not
mandates requiring physician compliance with MCO goals,
they do provide the MCO with influence, if not control, over
physicians by affecting their compensation. In withhold
schemes, a predetermined percentage of the capitation
payment is withheld and placed in a risk pool to act as a
buffer against unexpected costs, 226 that may arise from
referrals for specialists and high cost diagnostics or
treatment. Only if MCO designated goals are met may
providers be allowed to recover some part of their withheld
fees.2
27
Courts have split on whether fiduciary provisions of
ERISA compel MCOs to disclose to plan members the
221. See Brown, supra note 19, at 39.
222. See Stephen R. Latham, Regulation of Managed Care Incentive
Payments to Physicians, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 399, 402 (1998).
223. See id.
224. Id. at 403.
225. See Kevin Grumbach et. al., Primary Care Physicians' Experience of
Financial Incentives in Managed-Care Systems, 339 NEW ENG. J. IED. 1516,
1516 (1998) (research study finding 38% of physicians have bonus incentive
components in their agreements).
226. See Latham, supra note 222, at 404.
227. See id. Some schemes actually make physicians responsible for costs
incurred that exceed the risk pool. See id.
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financial incentives provided to health-care providers.228 The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has found an HMO does
have a duty to disclose financial incentives.229 The duty was
based on common law principles of loyalty that require an
ERISA fiduciary to reveal material facts, especially those
with a potentially negative impact on a plan member's
interests." ° Specifically, the Court found that because
patients rely on a provider's advice, they have to know if
that advice could be influenced by financial incentives."1
Subscribers have a right to be informed. 2 Courts, however,
continue to vary in finding such a right. 
3
Unfortunately, incentives are not currently structured
to differentiate between appropriate' and inappropriate
care." The current incentive structures do not target
waste, but rather require providers to assess all services
only in terms of their financial consequences rather than
228. Compare Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that
ERISA fiduciary provisions require disclosure of financial incentives offered by
HMOs), with Weiss v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp 748, 755 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (holding that ERISA does not require disclosure be included in the
summary plan descriptions because claims that profit motives make physicians
choose different treatment options that would breach their fiduciary duty was
speculative).
229. See Shea, 107 F.3d at 628.
230. See id.
231. See id. A fiduciary's duty to disclose material information is a central
role function; its roots date back to the common law of trusts. See id.; Eddy v.
Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding fiduciary did
not meet his duty to give correct and complete information).
232. See Shea, 107 F.3d at 629.
233. Compare Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1995) (dismissing a
class action suit alleging a fiduciary breach of duty against an MCO for creating
financial incentives because no claim was made that physicians were actually
coerced to breach their duties), with Drolet v. Healthsource, Inc., 968 F. Supp.
757, 759 (D.N.H. 1997) (finding in a class action suit that a fiduciary has a duty
to disclose material facts that could adversely affect the interests of a plan
member and that the duty also includes both an obligation to deal fairly and
honestly with plan members, and not to mislead). The mere existence of profit
incentives does not make violations of ERISA fiduciary duties inevitable. See
Varity, 516 U.S. at 515. Furthermore, ERISA does not require the summary
plan descriptions to include content on financial incentives nor do ERISA's
fiduciary obligations require disclosure. The fiduciary duty is limited to not
deceiving, misleading, or lying to participants. See id.
234. This may be defined as the standard for health-care services as
determined by health-care providers in accordance with the prevailing practices
and standards within the health-care profession and community. See, e.g., TEX.
Civ. PRAc. & REM. § 88.001(1) (1997).
235. See McGraw, supra note 22, at 1831.
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health benefit."5 The health-care system must seek a
careful balance to ensure that incentives discourage only
unnecessary (medical treatments that have been proven
ineffective) and inefficient (health outcome data prove little
or no beneficial effect) services that are tailored
appropriately to the covered population.
B. Proposed Incentive-Compatible Regulations and
Remedies
The interests of ERISA plan health-care providers and
enrollees are not the only factors to consider in the search
for successful solutions that will improve health-care
benefits. The interests of managed care organizations must
also be considered. Self-interests of all players are crucial to
determine and positively influence how each will operate in
their roles as plan participants, providers, or
administrators. Self-interests must be considered in the
design of any process or structure to assure everyone's self-
interests work to achieve, not frustrate, the desired
outcome of quality, cost-effective care. 7 Incentives need to
capitalize on self-interests to achieve quality cost-effective
care by affecting behaviors at the beginning of the health-
care system. Such an approach would be in stark contrast
to the present system that provides incentives to MCOs to
disregard, delay, and deny quality care for serious illnesses
when the very services at issue are most needed. Incentives
must be built into the regulatory structure so that
providers, enrollees, and plan administrators will choose to
achieve a common goal with minimal costs, regulations, and
proceedings.2 8  c wh
For example, in the Corcoran case where the fetus
died during the hours of the day that the plan had denied
nursing care to monitor the condition of the mother and
fetus, the knowledge that the family could bring a
236. See id. (quoting MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY AND MORALS 156
(1993)).
237. See EDWARD E. ZAJAC, POLITIcAL ECONOMY OF FAIRNESS 166 (1995).
238. See id. at 167; see also Barry R. Furrow, Managed Care Organizations
and Patient Injury: Rethinking Liability, 31 GA. L. REV. 419, 425 (1997) (stating
more tort litigation is needed to create incentives for MCOs to "pay attention to
patient risks").
239. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
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negligence action" ° against the MCO would have made it in
the plan's best interest to review and respect medical
necessity more carefully. The plan might then have
determined that its own best interests would be served by
seeking expert medical review of the case, which would
have revealed the risk to the fetus did not vary by the time
of the day. Medical judgments require medical expertise."4
However, such activities as careful medical reviews can
only advance the self-interest of MCOs when the health-
care regulatory and legal structures permit employee-
subscribers a significant remedy, such as that available
through a negligence action.2" MCOs will design and more
carefully administer direct financial incentives to providers
only if they are accountable in a negligence action for
attributable adverse outcomes. In Shea, ' for instance, the
MCO might have designed its incentives controlling
referrals to specialists more carefully if it knew it might
face extra-contractual damages. These damages could have
been for unjust enrichment-designed to disgorge savings
realized from Mr. Shea's early death when improper
incentives may have induced Mr. Shea's personal physician
240. MCOs have argued that by subjecting them to liability, their costs will
rise causing them to increase premiums and decrease benefits for subscribers.
This argument fails on at least two points. First, liability is an ordinary cost of
doing business. Second, it begs the issue of quality care and negligence. If
MCOs are delivering quality care, their costs should not increase from sudden
liability if no negligence exists. If MCOs are not delivering quality care, they
should not be immune from liability.
241. See DAviD L. LEITNER, MANAGED CARE LIABILITY, EXAMINING Risis AND
RESPONSIBILITIES IN A CHANGING HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 136 (1998).
242. Some critics have raised the concern that giving employee-subscribers
a right to bring negligence actions will increase costs, encourage frivolous law
suits, and prompt employers to drop insurance benefits. In response, it should
be noted that after a year of the right to sue health-care insurers in Texas, no
cases had been brought, the cost of insurance has not risen, employers have not
dropped their coverage, and the number of uninsured has not risen. See Molly
Ivins, Scandal Overshadowing Health-Care Fiascoes, BuFF. NEWS, Sept. 19,
1998, at C3. The Texas Department of Insurance, the designated external
review board, had predicted 4,400 complaints in the first year. There were only
531, almost half resolved in favor of the subscriber. See Corboy, supra note 14,
at 22. Missouri which also allows liability suits against HIMOs has had no suits
filed since its law was enacted in 1997. See id. Nearly as remarkable, a study of
approximately one million California government workers who do have the
right to sue their HMO showed only 20 subscribers had actually filed suits and
that the right to sue had added only $0.03-$0.13 to each policyholder's monthly
premium. See id.
243. 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
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to refuse a cardiology consult even though he was having
chest pain. An MCO's self-interests should encourage its
administrators to evaluate the incentive programs they
offer providers to ensure that only inefficient or wasteful,
not necessary care like Mr. Shea's cardiac evaluation, is
affected.
The Corcorans' and Sheas' interests, on the other hand,
would have been best served by bringing an appeal, rather
than costly litigation. A meaningful appeal process not only
could have reversed the plan's decision, but improved the
chances of survival for the Corcoran's unborn child and Mr.
Shea. But their interest in bringing an appeal could exist
only if incentive structures provide a prompt, medically
competent appeal process.
Other incentives can be borrowed from the MCO's own
successes. For example, financial incentives offered to
providers to control costs through elimination of
unnecessary or marginally-valuable care could similarly
be used to encourage MCOs to decrease their burgeoning
administrative costs.' Many MCOs currently engage in
withholds from providers. A similar approach targeting
MCOs could be used. Regulations to require MCOs to put a
percentage of subscribers' premiums into a reserve that is
returned to the MCO, for example, in proportion to a
measure of efficiency would encourage self-interested
behavior for MCOs to manage subscribers' funds more
efficiently and leave more of each premium dollar available
to provide health care. 5 MCO efficiency could be measured,
for example, by dollars spent for health services versus
dollars spent for administrative costs. Similarly, employers
could withhold a percentage of premiums paid to ERISA
health plans to be returned based on health outcomes and
employee satisfaction. MCOs pursue self-interested
behaviors that improve health outcomes by, for example,
sponsoring studies for evidence-based medical outcomes,"
244. See Jim McDermott, The First Step, 273 JAMA 251(1995) (stating the
nation's largest MCOs spend nearly $0.30 of every dollar paid in premium on
administrative overhead and profit); James J. Moynihan, The Administrative
Cost of Health Care: 1997 and Beyond, 51 HEALTHcARE FIN. MGMT. 102 (1997)
(stating large MCO administrative staffs have created high costs for hospitals
by requiring large amounts of information).
245. Perhaps dubious and expensive self-interest behaviors such as
mounting anti-healthcare reform advertising campaigns and naming baseball
parks will be discouraged. See Rovere, supra note 208, at B3.
246. See Frank J. Vandall, An Examination of the Duty Issue in Health Care
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and responding to claims, resulting in fewer legal actions.24
To permit these incentive regulations and actions,
ERISA requires amendment. The calls have been
numerous, but many of the problems which originally
justified the preemption provision still exist.24  One
approach could be a simple amendment modifying section
502(a)(1)(B) to read that state laws governing the quality of
health care in benefit plans are not preempted. State law
claims based upon negligence, wrongful death, vicarious
liability and direct liability would therefore not be
preempted and any negligent actions would properly belong
in state court.
In the alternative, if such an amendment is not
politically feasible because of the long-standing concerns
related to inconsistent state laws, remedies could be added
to give meaningful relief to injured plan participants, and to
serve as significant incentives to plan administrators to
make careful benefit determinations. A section could be
added to 502(a)(1)(B) providing remedies in federal court for
damages proximately flowing from denial or delay in
approving necessary covered medical benefits. These
damage awards could include, for example, legal costs,
reasonable attorney's fees, punitive damages, medical
expenses, and lost wages, giving MCOs powerful incentives
to make careful medical benefit decisions. Strong remedies
in federal court could provide significant incentives without
resulting in the potentially variable experience state courts
might present.
ERISA could also be amended to assure incentives do
not exist to promote frivolous claims from subscribers,
circumvention of effective appeals processes, or delay tactics
by plans. The statute could be amended to award attorney's
fees and costs to a prevailing defendant if suits are found to
be in bad faith or to have no reasonable basis in law or
Litigation: Should HMOs Be Liable in Tort for "Medical Necessity" Decisions?,
71 TEmp. L. REV. 293, 319 (1998) (stating the lack of reliable research
evaluating the effectiveness of many procedures, tests, and treatments should
prompt HMOs to fund research to answer these clinical questions).
247. The Threat of Evidence-Based Definitions of Medical Necessity,
http'//www.healthlaw.orgmednecessity.html (collected Mar. 1, 1999 17:58:00
EST) (on file with the author and with BUFFALO LAW REVMW) (noting that if not
properly implemented, evidence-based standards could have unintended
consequences of limiting services to only those proven through research studies,
especially hurting women, minorities, the elderly, and children).
248. See the discussion of the history of preemption, supra Part I.
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fact. 9 However, if an action was promptly discontinued
when the party or the attorney learned or should have
learned that the action lacked a reasonable basis, the court
could find that the party or the attorney did not act in bad
faith."0 Similarly, if a court found a plan engaged in delay
tactics, attorney's fees and costs could be awarded to a
plaintiff.
If ERISA is not amended, the federal courts will
continue to decide issues of health-care regulation
historically intended to be decided by the states. The courts
will need to make their decisions based on the challenges of
health care today," l not on what it was when ERISA and
the HMOA were passed twenty-five years ago. A common
law approach that differentiates between the quality of
benefits received (not preempted) and actual benefit
determinations (preempted) may allow people with private
employer-provided benefits to have treatment equal to
other MCO subscribers. 52 Even without federal health-care
reform or politically difficult amendments to ERISA, benefit
plan subscribers would be able to recover for injuries
resulting from poor quality care if the courts continue to
fashion remedies ERISA neglected.
Ultimately, amending ERISA provides the best
solution. Reliance on courts to perform the legislature's
function is seldom satisfactory.23 Overall, state and federal
cases deciding issues of ERISA preemption and employees'
claims against health insurers have been confusing, mixed,
and seldom led to predictable results.2' As Justice Scalia
observed, despite fourteen previous decisions regarding
ERISA preemption, the rate of new cases seeking review by
the Supreme Court has not decreased.255 Clear incentives to
create self-interested behaviors that are consistent with
quality, cost-effective care are needed to develop flexible,
creative solutions that will achieve optimal health benefits
and outcomes. Regardless of how the regulatory void is
249. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. 303(I) for remedies in federal bankruptcy that could
serve as a model.
250. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8303-a(c)(i) (McKinney 1999).
251. See Mariner, supra note 46, at 868.
252. See id.
253. See Rodwin, supra note 143, at 1346.
254. See California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham
Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 320 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that prior
Supreme Court decisions had failed to clarify the law).
255. See id.
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addressed, we cannot continue to allow similarly situated
Americans to have different rights and remedies depending
solely on who pays their health benefits. There may be no
one prince among the frogs, but careful evaluation of
judicial, regulatory, and legislative options will reveal
viable present solutions, and future options, keeping us
from seeking a prince by "kissing a pig."
